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Corruption has severe negative consequences for societies. 
It hinders economic development (e.g. Mauro, 1995), 
increases economic inequality (e.g. Fisman and Golden, 
2017), decreases trust in government and other political 
institutions (e.g. Ares and Hernández, 2017), and obstructs 
the fundamental democratic principle of citizens’ impartial 
access to political institutions (Rothstein and Varraich, 
2017). Despite its damaging side effects, corruption is still 
widely spread and is present in all types of political systems 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Even though research on the 
causes and remedies of corruption has exponentially grown 
since the 1990s, it is still unclear as to what the best strate-
gies are to curb corruption; some anti-corruption policies 
have failed dramatically (Fisman and Golden, 2017). One 
of the key queries that must be further addressed is the pres-
ence of corruption in democratic countries. From a theo-
retical point of view, it is puzzling how corrupt governments 
survive in democratic societies, as one of the main func-
tions of free elections, a fundamental to every democracy 
(Dahl, 1971), is to hold governments accountable. Schmitter 
and Karl (1991) define modern political democracy as “a 
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable 
for their actions in the public realm by citizens…” (p.76).
According to both the sanctioning and the selecting model 
of voting behavior, it is theoretically unconceivable why an 
informed and free citizen would vote for a corrupt incumbent 
(for a review on voting models, see Healy and Malhotra, 
2013). Corruption is a clear signal of a harmful government 
that will not act in the voters’ best interests, and also a dis-
tinct motive to sanction the ruling government (Fearon, 
1999). Yet, empirical evidence drawn from observational 
data, field and survey experiments, shows that voters around 
the world only mildly punish corrupt politicians (e.g. Chang 
et al., 2010; Dimock and Jacobson, 1995; Peters and Welch, 
1980; Reed, 1999). However, when interviewed in surveys, 
citizens were able to identify malfeasant activities, express 
their clear rejection of corruption (Afrobarometer Round 31; 
World Values Survey, Wave 6, V2022), and their low inten-
tions to support corrupt politicians (e.g. Muñoz et al., 2016).
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The coexistence of harsh disapproval of corruption and the limited electoral consequences of malfeasant behavior remains 
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Different arguments have been used to explain the coex-
istence of a harsh disapproval of corruption and the low 
electoral punishment of corrupt politicians (for a review, 
see De Vries and Solaz, 2017). This paper tests the trade-off 
hypothesis, which proposes that voters condone corruption 
when politicians offer other valued characteristics. While 
some studies have looked at the moderating effects of (co)
partisanship, others have looked at the conditioning effects 
of the candidate’s economic performance. Through a multi-
dimensional survey experiment, this article tests both trade-
off hypotheses in one experimental setting. It consequently 
increases the external validity of the study, as it provides a 
more accurate account of what is happening in real elec-
tions where voters are confronted with multiple trade-offs 
when casting their vote. In addition, the paper discusses 
two means of understanding the trade-off hypothesis and 
the differential impact these could have on anti-corruption 
policies.
Theoretical framework
Regarding the reasons that informed and free citizens vote 
for corrupt politicians, the literature has highlighted the 
relative importance of corruption when selecting a candi-
date. According to Rundquist et al. (1977), voters seem to 
care about corruption, but they also have other concerns 
and may trade integrity for other valued characteristics of 
the candidate. These authors pointed to an implicit exchange 
between the integrity of the candidate and her position on 
certain policies or issues. Voters might forgive corruption 
when malfeasant candidates take a position on issues that 
are more important to them.
A number of previous studies have shown that partisan-
ship moderates the perception of corruption (e.g. Anduiza 
et al., 2013; De Vries and Solaz, 2017; Eggers, 2014) and 
electoral fraud (Beaulieu, 2014). In a survey experiment 
conducted in Spain, Anduiza et al. (2013) found that 
respondents consider corruption less severe when it affects 
the party they feel closer to. Nevertheless, Konstantinidis 
and Xezonakis (2013) did not corroborate these results in 
a study conducted in Greece. The authors of the latter 
study argued that the different results might be due to the 
strong partisan alliances in place in the political context 
where the survey experiment by Anduiza et al. (2013) was 
launched. In this paper, I reassess these results in the same 
country, but during a time when new parties have recently 
entered the political arena and, therefore, party loyalties 
might not yet be as strong.
Moreover, this paper poses a harder test for the partisan 
trade-off. Respondents also received varying information 
regarding other candidates’ attributes that have been found 
to be important determinants of the vote, such as the eco-
nomic performance of the candidate (for a review, see 
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). Building on the same 
idea of the relative importance of corruption, recent studies 
set their attention on a trade-off between integrity and the 
competence of candidates in other areas. According to this 
literature, voters disregard corruption when candidates 
deliver other benefits, such as economic growth or other 
public goods. Several prior studies on voting for corrupt 
politicians provide evidence that corruption is less pun-
ished in good economic contexts (Klašnja and Tucker, 
2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013), when the 
politician has a good management record (Esaiasson and 
Muñoz, 2014; Muñoz et al., 2016), or when he/she has 
implemented favorable economic policies (Konstantinidis 
and Xezonakis, 2013). Nevertheless, other research did not 
obtain the same results. According to Winters and Weitz-
Shapiro (2013), when voters learn about corruption, they 
punish those candidates even if they performed well. 
Therefore, it is essential to reassess this hypothesis and 
verify if the economic performance of a candidate actually 
determines whether voters condone corruption at the polls. 
Likewise, this study poses a hard test for this hypothesis as 
respondents also received information on the candidates’ 
partisan affiliations.
This paper provides at least two contributions to the lit-
erature. It is one of the first studies to test both trade-offs in 
one survey experimental setting. By using the data of an 
original conjoint analysis, this study evaluates how respond-
ents make decisions in a multidimensional scenario where 
they have to take several trade-offs into consideration. 
Whereas most previous studies have tested the moderating 
effect of partisanship and a good economic performance 
separately, this paper reassesses their moderating effect in a 
multidimensional scenario. Respondents received informa-
tion on various candidates’ characteristics, thus posing a 
more difficult test for both hypotheses.
Currently, other researchers are assessing corruption 
accountability with a multidimensional perspective. 
However, the main aim of these studies differs substantially 
from this article, both in the hypotheses they are trying to 
assess and in their research design. While in this paper I 
assess the moderating effect of candidates’ characteristics 
on the electoral punishment of corruption, Visconti and 
Mares (2018) and Klašnja et al. (2017) implemented con-
joint experiments to mainly assess whether certain corrup-
tion characteristics moderate the negative effect of 
malfeasant activities. Perhaps the study by Franchino and 
Zucchini (2014) is most closely related to this article; how-
ever, this also differs considerably from this paper in terms 
of the literature it engages with and the candidate character-
istics that it assesses (refer to online Appendix B for a more 
specific comparison).
In addition to assessing the conditional effect of co-par-
tisanship and the economic performance of a candidate, 
this study also estimates and compares their relative weight 
on the likelihood of voting for a politician. Participants 
were presented with profiles of two mayors with randomly 
assigned information on the candidates’ party affiliation, 
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economic performance, integrity (corruption), educational 
and managerial qualities, and gender, and were asked to 
report their probability of voting for each candidate. This 
allows for determining the relative causal effect of each 
candidate’s characteristics on the respondent’s probability 
of supporting the candidate (Hainmueller et al., 2014).
The distinction between the relative importance of dif-
ferent factors and their moderating effect on the electoral 
punishment of corrupt candidates is directly linked with the 
second contribution of this paper. Previous research has not 
agreed on exactly what the trade-off hypothesis entails, and 
is, therefore, unclear on how to measure it. Some studies 
have looked at the factors that moderate the electoral pun-
ishment of corruption, while others have theorized about 
the relative importance of corruption. Nevertheless, these 
two ways of explaining the trade-off hypothesis entail a dif-
ferent causal mechanism and, therefore, may entail a differ-
ent consequence for policies that aim to combat corruption 
by increasing citizens’ awareness.
The relative weight argument, drawn from the discus-
sions in previous literature and the public arena, proposes 
that corruption is just another factor voters consider when 
casting their vote and that they might give more importance 
to issues other than corruption (e.g. Fisman and Golden, 
2017). This explanation is in keeping with the argument of 
Rundquist et al. (1977), which assumes a rational voter that 
weighs the candidates’ characteristics and votes accord-
ingly. According to this hypothesis, voters choose a crooked 
politician when they weigh her partisan affiliation or her 
economic performance stronger than her integrity. The sec-
ond approach, which I call the “conditional punishment 
argument”, proposes that the negative effect of corruption 
on the support of a candidate may diminish when the candi-
date exhibits other positive characteristics. This argument is 
in keeping with the research, showing that a good economic 
situation moderates the negative evaluation of a corrupt can-
didate (e.g. Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013). In 
this case, the causal mechanism could be less rational, as 
voters might vary how they weigh a candidate’s corruption 
allegations depending on other candidate qualities. 
Therefore, the assumption here is not that voters rationally 
choose a corrupt candidate because they give priority to 
other characteristics. In this case, voters could be equally or 
more concerned with the candidate’s integrity; nevertheless, 
other positive candidate characteristics could unconsciously 
influence integrity’s relevance on their decision-making. 
For example, Anduiza et al. (2013) provide evidence that 
respondents diminish the perceived severity of a co-partisan’s 
corrupt activity to avoid cognitive dissonance.
Both hypotheses have different substantive implica-
tions. While the relative weight hypothesis conceives a 
rational voter that simply chooses to overlook corruption, 
the conditional punishment hypothesis conceives a voter 
that might be unconsciously driven by psychological 
biases. Moreover, these two conceptions have different 
implications for anti-corruption campaigns. If voters are 
rational and vote according to the importance they attach 
to each candidate’s characteristics, anti-corruption cam-
paigns simply have to inform about politicians’ malfeas-
ant behavior, insist on the negative consequences of 
corruption for society, and address the necessity for voters 
to hold politicians accountable. However, if voters are 
driven by unconscious biases, the strategies to motivate 
them to hold politicians accountable at the polls might not 
be as straightforward and successful. In that case, even if 
voters are informed about the negative consequences of 
malfeasant behavior and their ability to hold politicians 
accountable, psychological biases, driven by co-partisanship 
or a strong economic performance, might affect how they 
perceive the severity of malfeasant activities of their pre-
ferred politicians.
Empirical strategy
To test the trade-off hypotheses, this study uses the data of 
an original conjoint experiment embedded in a representa-
tive survey of the Spanish population. Survey experiments 
have proven to be a unique technique to assess causal infer-
ence and to overcome social desirability biases, which 
could be in place in this study as it is dealing with a sensi-
tive issue (for a review on advantages and limitations of 
survey experiments, see Sniderman, 2018). In conjoint 
experiments, in contrast to standard survey designs, several 
pieces of information are manipulated in one setting. It con-
sequently allows for varying and analyzing different dimen-
sions of the studied phenomenon and so increases the 
external validity of the research.
Respondents were presented the profiles of two mayors 
with a set of five attributes with independently randomly 
assigned categories (or components) and were asked to 
report their likelihood of voting for each candidate if they 
were running for elections in their hometown. Each 
respondent was asked to repeat the same task three times 
with random and varying pairs of candidates. The experi-
ment was completely randomized, so no combination of 
attributes was restricted; the sequences of the attributes 
were also randomized across each respondent but kept con-
stant over the three tasks. This procedure allows for the 
estimation of the relative influence of each attribute and 
enables us to assess how the attributes interact with each 
other (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Hence, the conjoint design 
is ideal to evaluate what is the variable that most deter-
mines the vote (relative weight argument) and whether any 
factors moderate the negative effects of corruption (condi-
tional punishment argument).
The experiment was embedded in an online survey 
(n = 2275) in Spain in June 2016. The sample included 
quotas to achieve an accurate representation of the 
Spanish population (refer to online Appendix B for more 
information about the survey). Spain is an appropriate 
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setting to conduct this experiment for various reasons. It 
is a democratic country that holds free elections with 
average levels of corruption, scoring 58 on a scale of 
zero (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) in 2015 accord-
ing to the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency 
International. Thus, corruption scandals are salient 
issues in Spanish politics. This makes it a good setting to 
test our hypotheses, as respondents are confronted with 
situations they have either experienced or, at least, heard 
of and read about. Moreover, Spain is a typical case in 
that citizens report a highly negative view of corruption 
in surveys but often do not punish corrupt politicians in 
elections. According to a survey conducted by the offi-
cial survey institute of the Spanish government (Centro 
de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2905) in 2011, 87% of 
respondents considered that corruption is a problem of 
paramount importance. Consistent with these percep-
tions, only 10% acknowledged that they would vote for 
a corrupt but efficient candidate. However, if we turn to 
the actual electoral results, electoral punishment is very 
low or even nonexistent (Costas-Pérez et al., 2012; 
Rivero and Fernández-Vázquez, 2010).
Table 1 shows the categories for each attribute and the 
corresponding text that was shown in the experiment. 
Please refer to online Appendix B for a precise justification 
of the selection and operationalization of each attribute 
included in the experiment.
Concerning the dependent variable, respondents 
expressed their probability of voting for each candidate on 
a scale from zero (“would never vote for”) to 10 (“would 
definitely vote for”). The answers were rescaled from zero 
to one. I selected this dependent variable instead of a forced 
choice between candidates because the probability of vot-
ing allows respondents to not vote for any candidate and, 
therefore, bears a stronger resemblance to real elections.3 
Furthermore, Hainmueller et al. (2015) show that paired 
conjoint experiments with a question for each option are 
better at eliciting behavior in real situations.
Overall, there were 12,284 evaluated profiles or 6142 
pairs of candidates. Table A.1 in the online Appendix shows 
the distribution of the vote probability across the different 
treatments. The average vote probability of an honest can-
didate is 0.49.
Results
In this article, the probability of respondent i voting for a 
candidate k in task j is modeled as a function of the candi-
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According to the relative weight model, voters elect cor-
rupt candidates when they weigh other issues or character-
istics more strongly than corruption. Consequently, this 
hypothesis is corroborated if the effect of other variables, 
such as partisanship and economic performance, is stronger 
than the effect of corruption on the probability to vote for a 
candidate.
The complete randomization of the experiments allows 
us to estimate the average marginal component effects 
(AMCEs) by fitting a linear regression and clustering for 
respondents, as each respondent repeated the same task 
three times (Hainmueller et al., 2014).5 The AMCEs (shown 
in Figure 1) can be interpreted as the marginal effects of 
changing a given characteristic (or category) on the popula-
tion’s probability to vote for a candidate averaged over all 
possible values of the other characteristics. Results show 
that the information about corruption has a strong negative 
effect on support. The accusation of corruption by other 
political parties decreases the support of a candidate by 
0.22 (on a scale from 0 to 1) as compared to the level of 
support for an honest candidate, while the accusation of a 
judge does so by 0.27. It is especially remarkable to observe 
that even though the experiment uses a strong treatment of 
corruption and refers explicitly to corruption, under certain 
conditions, partisanship has an equally strong effect on the 
support of a candidate as corruption.6 Seeing the profile of 
a candidate belonging to a different party decreases the sup-
port to the same degree as an accusation of corruption by a 
judge. These results were corroborated using a variable that 
differentiates between nonpartisans and partisans of another 







Qualities Has compulsory education and little 
management experience




Investments in the municipality have 
increased so that unemployment has 
decreased by 5%
Investments in the municipality have 
decreased so that unemployment has 
increased by 5%
Corruption Has been characterized for his/her honesty
Has been accused by other parties of 
corruption for awarding contracts in 
exchange for gifts
Has been accused by the judge of 
corruption for awarding contracts in 
exchange for gifts
Breitenstein 5
party and another variable that measures party preferences 
instead of partisanship (see online Appendix A, Figures A1 
and A2).
Regarding the economic performance of the candidate, a 
weak economic performance has a significant negative 
effect on the support of a candidate, but this effect is con-
siderably weaker than the effect of corruption. A low edu-
cation and little management experience also significantly 
decrease the level of support for a candidate.
Overall, the results of the experiment show that 
respondents not only care about corruption, but there are 
other candidate characteristics that determine the likeli-
hood of voting for that candidate. Indeed, a certain combi-
nation of variables increases the probability of voting for 
a corrupt candidate. For example, respondents’ average 
probability of voting for an honest candidate from a dif-
ferent party with a weak economic performance and low 
educational and managerial qualities is only 0.39, while 
the probability of voting for a co-partisan candidate with 
a strong economic performance and high educational and 
managerial qualities who is accused of corruption by other 
parties is 0.61.
To test the conditional punishment argument, it is neces-
sary to determine whether the negative effect of corruption 
on the support of a candidate varies according to the parti-
sanship or the economic performance of the candidate. To 
do that, I estimate the average difference in the AMCEs of 
corruption between different profiles of candidates (see 
Hainmueller et al., 2014: 12). The conditional punishment 
hypothesis is corroborated if corruption has a weaker nega-
tive effect when the candidate is a co-partisan or delivered 
a strong economic performance.
Table 2 shows the percentage of change in the probabil-
ity of voting for a co-partisan candidate or a candidate with 
a strong economic performance when accused of corrup-
tion (grouping both partisan and judicial accusation of cor-
ruption). The results show that an accusation of corruption 
has a weaker negative impact on the likelihood of receiving 
a vote when the candidate belongs to the same party as the 
voter. Corruption decreases the probability of voting for a 
candidate belonging to a different party by 52%, while the 
vote probability only decreases by 40% for a co-partisan 
candidate. The semi-elasticities in Table 3, which provide 
the proportional change in Y for a change in X, confirm that 
this differential impact is strong and significant at a 99% 
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Figure 1. Average marginal component effects (AMCEs).
Table 2. Predicted probabilities and the relative reduction of corruption.













 Lower Higher  (%) Lower Higher  (%)
Honest 0.746 0.724 0.768 0.445 0.431 0.459  
Corrupt 0.448 0.426 0.470 39.930 0.211 0.201 0.220 52.658
 













 Lower Higher  (%) Lower Higher  (%)
Honest 0.542 0.525 0.558 0.441 0.425 0.456  
Corrupt 0.278 0.266 0.289 48.695 0.216 0.206 0.227 50.931
Note: the first column of each group shows the predicted values of respondents voting for a candidate. The last column shows the  
relative reduction in the probability of voting for the same candidate with the added component of being accused of corruption (grouping both 
partisan and judicial accusation of corruption), taking always as a reference the probability of voting for an honest candidate in each group.
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the candidate is concerned, the conditional punishment 
hypothesis only holds true to some extent. Information on 
corruption has a weaker effect when a candidate delivered 
a strong economic performance; nevertheless, the differ-
ence is small (2 percentage points) and only holds at a 90% 
confidence interval. In summary, the results of this experi-
ment show that the negative effect of corruption is indeed 
attenuated by co-partisanship and, to a lesser extent, by the 
economic performance of the candidate.
Conclusion
This paper provides compelling evidence that respondents 
care about corruption but also care about other candidate 
characteristics. Analyzing the results of a conjoint experi-
ment proves that in a multidimensional setting, participants 
trade out integrity for other valued characteristics. While 
previous studies have tested the moderating effect of parti-
sanship and a good performance individually, this study 
contributes to the literature by assessing how respondents 
react when they also receive information on many other 
candidates’ characteristics. In addition, this study helps us 
to understand not only the moderating effect of partisanship 
and a strong economic performance, but also their relative 
importance on the probability of voting for a candidate.
The results of this multidimensional survey experiment 
confirm a trade-off between integrity and co-partisanship. 
In line with previous findings (Anduiza et al., 2013; Barnes 
and Beaulieu, 2014; Beaulieu, 2014), co-partisanship 
strongly moderates the negative effect corruption has on 
the likelihood of voting for a politician. Furthermore, parti-
sanship, together with corruption, is the attribute that most 
determines the vote. However, the results only partly cor-
roborate a trade-off between the economic performance 
and the integrity of a candidate. While in this experiment 
corruption determines the vote to a much greater extent 
than the economic performance of a candidate, the eco-
nomic performance does moderate the negative effect of 
corruption. However, this conditioning effect is mild and 
does not hold across all robustness checks. In summary, 
this study corroborates the importance of partisanship in 
condoning corruption. While this study finds some evi-
dence in favor of the economic performance trade-off, 
these results are by no means as strong as the partisanship 
trade-off.
As shown in the analysis of this paper, the relative weight 
and the conditional punishment model can be compatible, as 
partisanship determines the vote to the same extent as cor-
ruption; however, partisanship also moderates the effects of 
corruption. Although these models are not mutually exclu-
sive, it is important to distinguish them in future research as 
they could entail different causal mechanisms based on dis-
tinct rationality in voters’ decision-making. Ultimately, 
these models could have a differential impact on anti-cor-
ruption policies that aim to engage citizens in the control of 
corruption. Due to the properties of the conjoint design, in 
this paper, I could not test the rationale behind respondents’ 
decisions. Future research should now determine the exact 
pathways that might drive each argument.
Concerning the elicitation of stated preferences with 
hypothetical scenarios, Hainmueller et al. (2015) demon-
strated that paired conjoint experiments are highly success-
ful in replicating the decision-making that takes place in 
real settings. Furthermore, I consider the high credibility of 
the information provided in this experiment an advantage 
of this study as it poses a solid test for the trade-off hypoth-
eses. This paper shows that even when obtaining highly 
credible information and, therefore, being certain that a 
candidate is corrupt, respondents are willing to trade integ-
rity for other valued characteristics of the candidate. Hence, 
I provide clear-cut evidence that even informed citizens 
might choose to overlook corruption.
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Note: the first column shows the proportional change of Y when the 
candidate is corrupt across the different categories of partisanship and 
economic performance. The contrast column shows the difference in 
the change of Y between each reference category and the rest of the 
categories and the significance associated with these differences.
Breitenstein 7
from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity and the 
European Social Fund. The data were collected within the project 
“Living with Hard Times: How Citizens React to Economic Crises 
and Their Social and Political Consequences” (LIVEWHAT). This 
project was funded by the European Commission under the 7th 
Framework Program (grant number 613237).
Supplemental materials
The supplemental files are available at http://journals.sagepub.
com/doi/suppl/10.1177/2053168019832230
The replication files are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/
dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/HOSWS7
Notes
1. A clear majority of respondents across all countries consid-
ered that it is wrong and punishable if a government offi-
cial (i) “gives a job to someone from his family who does 
not have adequate qualifications”, (ii) “demands a favor or 
an additional payment for some service that is part of his 
job”, or (iii) “decides to locate a development project in an 
area where his friends and supporters lived” (Q58a–c) (“The 
online data analysis tool | Afrobarometer,” n.d.).
2. A clear majority of respondents across all counties consider 
“someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties” (V202) 
is never justifiable (“World Values Survey Database,” n.d.).
3. Refer to online Appendix A (Tables A15–A17) for the results 
of the forced choice as a dependent variable.
4. Measured by combining the respondent’s party identifica-
tion, acquired before the experiment, and the party that is 
being assessed in the experiment.
5. Results are corroborated using a linear regression with indi-
vidual fixed effects.
6. Refer to online Appendix A for several robustness checks. 
These results hold along all tests except for the model that 
uses the forced choice as a dependent variable. The relative 
effect of the variables is slightly different when respondents 
were forced to choose one of the two candidates.
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